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 3 
Introduction 
Since the start of the twenty-first century, non-Western countries are rising while at 
the same time the United States’ (U.S.) relative power declines. This resembles a 
transformation from unipolarity to multipolarity in the world order. Rising powers, 
and in particular Brazil, Russia, India, China and South-Africa (BRICS), are 
demanding their stake in international developments. Next to that, their convergence 
on certain agendas and growing international influence has been noticeable in areas 
such as climate change, humanitarian intervention, non-proliferation, but also in 
behaviour at institutions like the WTO, UN and IMF. The same goes for the issue of 
Iran’s nuclear development, which is the topic of this thesis.     
 Critics are asking what the possible implications are for multipolarity, and 
how this may affect their country in the future.
1
 To start answering this question, it is 
important to look at the recent developments in the behaviour of the rising states, in 
order to understand how these states aim to give shape to the changing world. To 
understand the behaviour of the BRICS countries in the context of their assertive 
behaviour, this thesis will focus on the international behaviour of the BRICS countries 
towards Iran’s nuclear issue, asking: Why, how and to what degree do the BRICS 
countries behave more assertively towards Iran’s nuclear issue? 
 According to the Oxford dictionary, assertive behaviour is “expressing 
opinions or desires strongly and with confidence, so that people take notice”. 2 
Investigating the assertive behaviour of the rising states, this thesis has four main 
objectives. In chapter one the first two objectives will be addressed, which are, the 
contextualization of non-Western rising powers, with the main focus on the BRICS 
countries, and the identification of the more assertive behaviour of the BRICS in IR 
politics in general. The third objective is the analysis of the BRICS’ international 
assertive behaviour on Iran’s nuclear issue, which will be addressed during the case 
study in chapter two. Finally, this thesis will try to contribute to the understanding and 
theorization of the behaviour of rising states connected to international issues like the 
Iranian nuclear issue.  
 The Iranian nuclear issue is one of the main issues the international order is 
                                                 
1
 Nau, H. R., & Ollapally, D. M. (Eds.). (2012). Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy 
Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia. Oxford University Press. P.3 
2
 Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries. Retrieved July 3, 2015, from 
http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/assertive 
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dealing with now, and by which the behaviour of rising powers can be examined. To 
answer the research question, theory about the phenomenon of rising states, and in 
particular the BRICS countries, is needed in order to understand what rising powers 
are and why they behave the way they do. Rising powers are getting an increasing 
influential role in world politics, have potential to rise in the power hierarchy and 
challenge the status quo with their behaviour in order to achieve their individual aims. 
To analyse the assertive behaviour of the BRICS countries towards Iran’s nuclear 
issue, detailed data collection is needed. The data collection consists of voting 
behaviour of the BRICS (on the occasion of sanctions, and on the occasion of other 
resolutions on nuclear development), foreign policy documents, statements 
(supporting/condemning statements to the address of countries suspected nuclear 
weapons programs, criticism of the U.S. or other Western countries, critical 
statements about sanctions) in addition to scholarly articles and books.  
 Using content analysis to analyse the data, this thesis will find that the BRICS 
countries do – to a certain extent – behave assertively towards Iran’s nuclear issue, 
both individually and as a group. This assertive behaviour of the BRICS can be seen 
as efforts to challenge Western hegemony, and a way to assert their independence of 
the West. However, there are reasons why the BRICS countries are still struggling 
with their position in the world. As a starting point, the situations of these countries in 
relation to the issue of Iran may help to understand their constraints in developing in 
contrast to the hegemon.  
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Chapter I: The BRICS In The International System 
 
1.1 From Unipolarity to Multipolarity 
The world is changing: For the last twenty-five years, non-Western rising countries 
have grown faster than the developed countries, which indicates a transformation 
from unipolarity to multipolarity in the world order.
 3
 However, although many 
scholars write about the ‘end of the American unipolar moment’, and the ‘abrupt rise’ 
of the rising powers, which will result in a ‘complete multipolar word by 2025’, much 
of these projections are probably exaggerated.
4
 Right now, the U.S. is still the lone 
superpower in military, diplomatic and economic terms, and according to Barry Posen, 
the rising states will certainly undergo some interruptions in their ‘rise’ in the coming 
years.
5
 Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that the role of non-Western countries in 
the world order is slowly changing. Randall Schweller & Xiaoyu Pu argue that there 
is a cyclical pattern of this transformation from unipolarity to multipolarity. This 
cycle exist of five phases: “(1) a stable order, (2) the deconcentration and 
delegitimation of the hegemon’s power, (3) arms build- ups and the formation of 
alliances, (4) a resolution of the international crisis, often through hegemonic war, 
and (5) system renewal”. 6  According to their analyses, the current international 
system is now entering the second phase.  
 According to Schweller & Pu, the shift to multipolarity tells us that non-
Western countries are gaining more power, and that they will join the U.S. within the 
global system.
7
 From the end of the Second World War onwards, the U.S. has 
accommodated and accepted the now rising powers, as may be conducted from the 
replacement of the G8 by the G20.
 8
 Therefore, the U.S. power relatively declines 
while the voices of the rising states become more prominent.
9
 However, the apparent 
shift to multipolarity does not indicate how multipolarity will come or whether the 
                                                 
3
 Nau & Ollapally (2012, 3).  
4
 Schaefer, M. E., & Poffenbarger, J. G. (2014). The Formation of the BRICS and its Implication for the 
United States: Rising Together. Palgrave Macmillan. ISO 690. P.1  
and Hart, A. F., & Jones, B. D. (2010). How do rising powers rise? Survival, 52(6), 63-88. P.63 
5
 Posen, B. R. (2009). Emerging multipolarity: why should we care? Current History, 108(721), 347-352. 
P.347 
6
 Schweller, R. L., & Pu, X. (2011). After unipolarity: China's visions of international order in an era of US 
decline. International Security, 36(1), 41-72. P.44 
7
 Schweller and Pu (2011, 42).  
8
 Hart & Jones (2010, 63) and Nau and Ollapally (2012, 5-6) 
9
 Nau & Ollapally (2012, 6) 
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rising powers will, over time, accept or reject the Western established world order.
10
 
How multipolarity will arrive depends on how the rising powers want to be, how they 
will use their enhanced power and what their goals are in the new international system. 
The behaviour of the rising powers is thus determinative for the shape international 
politics will take in the future. 
 
1.2 The Concept of Rising Powers 
According to Oliver Stuenkel, most scholars agree that a multipolar world makes the 
world order more complicated in the 21
st
 century.
 11
 This is mainly because these 
rising powers have different views, positions and opinions than the established 
Western powers.
12
 Related to this is the difficulty to define ‘rising powers’. Some 
scholars like Sauer argue that rising powers are countries that have the capability to 
“intervene [..] in international politics”.13 Other scholars argue that a rising power is 
a country with growing economic growth rates and huge economic potential.
 14
 And 
some scholars, such as Nye, argue that rising powers are states that possess rising hard 
and soft power resources.
 15
 However, in order to understand the concept ‘rising 
power’, we have to take a step back and think about term conceptualization. Since the 
concept of the ‘rising powers’ presupposes common characteristics, we will try to find 
these common characteristics in the following paragraphs to come to a good 
understanding of the concept and a decent definition of rising powers.  
 
1.2.1 Hard and soft Power Resources 
The most important characteristic of rising states is their economic weight.
16
 Often is 
point to the BRICS countries, a term Goldman Sachs came with referring to the strong 
and fast growing economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China, and since 2010 also 
South Africa. However, there are more significant characteristics besides a growing 
economy that determines a rising power.   
                                                 
10
 Schweller & Pu (2011, 42) 
11 Stuenkel, O. (2013, March 3). Book review: “Emerging powers and global challenges”. Post-Western 
World. Retrieved April 26, 2015, from http://www.postwesternworld.com/2013/03/02/book-review-
emerging-powers-and-global-challenges/ 
12 Ibid.  
13 Sauer, T. (2011). The Rising Powers and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Regime. 
Security Policy Brief 27, September 2011. 
14 Hart & Jones (2010, 65) 
15 Nye, J.S. (2004) Soft power: The means to success in politics. Public Affairs. 
16 Tank, P. (2012). The concept of “rising powers”. NOREF Policy Brief.P.2 
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 To come to an understanding of the concept of ‘rising powers’, we need to 
know the definition of ‘power’. For this purpose, I will use the definition of Joseph 
Nye, who describes power as “the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get 
the outcome one wants, which can be done by coercion, payments or attraction”. 17 
According to Nye, the ability to affect others by coercion and payments is termed 
‘hard power’, and the ability to affect others by attraction is termed ‘soft power’.18 
When describing a (rising) power, the main emphasis often lies on the hard power 
resources of a country. Hard power resources are tangible resources like strong and 
growing economy, military, technology and demographic resources. However, soft 
power projection is becoming increasingly important in world politics, and thus 
important to raise a country’s status from a regional power to a rising power. Soft 
power is linked to the possession of culture, political values and foreign policy 
resources like institutions, by which you can attract other actors to “want what you 
want”.19 Thus rising powers do not only have to possess a strong economy, but also 
other hard and soft power resources. According to Nye, however, the difficulty today 
is not to acquire these resources, but to convert power resources into influence since 
“resources do not constitute power by themselves”. 20  Thus when a country can 
translate the power resources into influence, it can really exercise power.
21
 
 
1.2.2 The Hierarchy of Power 
To be a rising power, a country should also be recognized as one by other states. 
According to Vidya Nadkarni and Norma Noonan, there is a hierarchical order of 
states in the world, which depends on a country’s power resources, scope of influence 
and the recognition by other states of its status.
 22
 As Jacek Kugler and Abramo 
Organski describe, this hierarchical order exists of four levels of powers between 
states, which is in order of precedence: superpower, great powers, middle powers and 
small powers.
 23
 Using this categorization, China is often acknowledged as a great 
                                                 
17
 Nye, J.S. (2004, 2)  
18 Nye, J.S. (2011) The future of power. Public Affairs. P.6 
19 Nye (2004, 31)  
20 Nye (2011, 8) 
21 Ibid. 
22 Nadkarni, V., & Noonan, N. C. (Eds.). (2013). Rising powers in a comparative perspective: the political 
and economic rise of the BRIC countries. Bloomsbury Publishing USA. P.6 
23 Kugler, J. A. F, K. Organski. 1989." The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation.". 
The Handbook of War Studies. Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, P72-174. 
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power and a rival to the United States. Russia, India and Brazil fall in the category of 
middle powers. They are also recognized as rising powers because first; they have a 
serious aspiration to great power status, second; their hard and soft power resources 
increases and third; they are becoming increasingly important in international politics. 
Also other countries, such as Turkey and South Africa, are seen as middle powers 
since they are often recognized as important regional powers. According to Pinar 
Tank, recognition as a regional power is often one of the “stepping-stones” to the 
position of a rising power.
 24
 This seems to be true since these countries are often 
recognized as a rising power, or at least they all share the aspiration to be recognised 
as one. 
1.2.3 Challenging the status quo 
Another characteristic of rising powers is that they are challenging the status quo of 
global politics.
25
 According to the power transition theory of Abramo Organski, the 
super power’s aim is to maintain the status quo of the international system, in which 
the strongest great powers are challenging the status quo because they are dissatisfied 
with their place in the international system and they try to get a better place for 
themselves.
 26
 In challenging the status quo, the rising powers will question Western 
established principles, bring international instability and try to increasingly exercise 
power. In the case of the current rising powers, their foreign policies challenge the 
U.S. hegemony by advocating for multilateralism, giving critique on unilateral action 
and highlighting the importance of international institutions and organizations.
27
 By 
arguing this, we have to keep in mind Tanks’ argument that the shift in power from 
the East to the West and the rise of the non-Western powers is not essentially the 
challenge to the international system.
28
 Instead, the real challenge is the existing 
uncertainty of the purposes the rising states have. It is, therefore, again not the 
question whether the rising powers will challenge the established system, but how 
they challenge the international system. 
 In short, rising powers are sovereign states with a rising economy and other 
strong and rising hard and soft power resources, and are able to convert these 
                                                 
24
 Tank (2012, 3) 
25 Harden, B. E. (2014). The Diplomatic Ambitions of the BRIC States: Challenging the Hegemony of the 
West. Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy, 2(2), 01-18. P.13 
26 Organski, A. F. (1958). World politics. Knopf. 
27 Harden (2014, 13) 
28 Tank (2012, 4) 
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resources into influence on a regional and global scale. Through this increasing 
influential role in international institutions and politics, they get the recognition as a 
rising state by other countries, they challenge the status quo, and have serious 
potential to rise in the global power hierarchy. But to know how they will challenge 
the established order to achieve their aims, and what role the rising powers intend to 
play in the future international system, we have to look at their behaviour.   
 
1.3 The BRICS 
In 2001, Jim O’Neill predicted that Brazil, Russia, India and China would play an 
increasingly important role in the global economy.
29
 According to the predictions, 
these BRIC countries would become a major power in the world economy in the next 
50 years, and gain increased political power.
30
 After five years of speculations about 
the idea of an institutionalised BRIC, the BRIC’s foreign ministers decided to 
organize a meeting in New York in 2006.
31
 Because of its success, they agreed to 
meet more frequently, and at the third meeting of the BRIC’s they shared the 
aspiration to become more cooperative with each other and form a political grouping 
with the objective to “build a more democratic international system founded on the 
rule of law and multilateral diplomacy”.32 
 There are different opinions why the BRICs aligned in a political grouping, 
which resulted in more assertive behaviour and influence in world politics. According 
to Posen, states do not want to get isolated in a world that is getting multipolar, so 
they are fanatically in the building of coalitions.
33
 And according to Stuenkel, states 
like the BRICs form a political grouping to reinforce each state’s international status, 
which could be useful for achieving individual objectives in future.
34
 An example 
may be drawn from the Londen 2009 summit. According Stuenkel and Alan 
Alexandroff & John Kirton, during this summit the BRIC countries were able to have 
                                                 
29
 O'Neill, J. (2001). Building better global economic BRICs. P.1 
30
 Harden (2014, 2) 
31 Ibid. 
32
 Singh, S. P., & Dube, M. (2014). BRICS and the World Order: A Beginner's Guide. Available at SSRN 
2443652. P.7 
33
 Posen (2009, 349-350) 
34
 Stuenkel, O. (2014). Rising Powers and Status: The Case of the First BRICs Summit. Asian 
Perspective, 38(1), 89-109. P2. 
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a more unified voice, which has put them in a better bargaining position.
 35
  Through 
this improved bargaining position they were able to assert their increased influence, 
which resulted in the by G20 agreed IMF quota reforms. On top of that, some 
observers argue that they only aligned in order to strengthen the cooperation between 
the four countries. And according to Francis Kornegay, the fundamental reason for the 
establishment of the BRIC grouping was the “increasing assertiveness” by Russia and 
China to try to change the world’s reserve currency in order to change the global 
economic order, including the Western dominance over the IMF and the World 
Bank.
36
 
 During the first annual summit of the BRICs on June 2009 in Yekaterinburg, it 
became clear that the BRIC countries transformed themselves from a loose economic 
grouping into a political bloc with the objective to strive for a more democratic and 
multipolar world. The timing of this transformation was ideal; it was conducted 
during highly unusual international economic and political circumstances, whereby 
the legitimacy of the United States was low.
37
 This, in addition to the shifting balance 
of power, gave the BRICS the opportunity to claim the status as important rising 
powers and to behave more assertively on the world stage and have more diplomatic 
influence.
38
 In 2010, the BRIC countries became the BRICS when they included South 
Africa to the group. Although many scholars argue that the BRICS as a bloc exists of 
some very different countries, the convergence on certain agendas and the growing 
assertiveness in global issues among these countries is remarkable as will be 
demonstrated in the following section.
39
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Stuenkel (2014, 2) and Alexandroff, A. & Kirton, J. ‘The “great recession” and the emergence of the G20 
leaders’ summit’. Rising States, Rising Institutions: The Challenge of Global Governance, ed. A.S. 
Alexandroff and A.F Cooper. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. P.185. 
36
 Kornegay, F.A. (2012, March 20). BRICS in search of identity. IGD: Institute for Global Dialogue. 
Retrieved May 10, 2015, from http://www.igd.org.za/index.php/179-brics-in-search-of-identity 
37
 Stuenkel (2014, 10) 
38
 Pu, X. (2012). Socialisation as a two-way process: Rising powers and the diffusion of international 
norms. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(4), 341-367. P.342 
39
 Singh and Dube (2014, 29) and Terhalle, M. (2011) ‘Reciprocal Socialisation: Rising Powers and the 
West’. International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 341-361. P.345 
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1.4 Assertive BRICS 
In the last decade, the BRICS countries became more assertive in international 
politics and less dependent on the West. Different scholars, like Marianne Wiesebron 
and Suresh Singh & Memory Dube have noticed their growing assertiveness, 
convergence on certain agendas and growing international influence in several fields 
and institutions of world politics.
 40
 As Andrew Hurrell notes, the increased attention 
for these global issues occurs simultaneously with the emergence of the BRICS, 
which led to a growing consensus that rising states are essential to develop 
meaningful solutions.
 41
 
 For example, the BRICS are behaving assertively when it comes to their 
position on climate change. Gideon Rachman argued in his article that their stance in 
this issue shows that they collectively form a bloc against the hegemon: “Look for 
example of how India and Brazil sided with China at the global climate change 
talks… That is just a taste of things to come”.42 During the 2009 Copenhagen climate 
negotiations, Brazil, India, China and South Africa decided to act as a group, and they 
agreed to leave the negotiation table together if their minimum position was not met 
by the Western states.
 43
 This joint act showed that the BRICS no longer agree with 
the unilateral arrangements of the West, or as Maximilian Terhalle states, “the 
B(R)ICS countries refuse to submit to Western leadership any longer”.44 Besides the 
BRICS’ assertive behaviour during the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, the BRICS also 
blocked the climate agreement in Durban together.
45
   
 Since the BRICS acknowledged the importance of the United Nations, they 
also tried to have more influence in the UN framework.
46
 But because the assertive 
BRICS do not fully agree with every Western-based UN principle, they are rebelling 
against them. The Western concept of humanitarian intervention and the 
                                                 
40
 Singh & Dube (2014, 29) and Wiesebron, M.L. (2014, October 16). EU foreign policy towards the BRICS. 
Retrieved May 16, 2015, from http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/1.-wiesebron-brics-the-view-from-
europe.pdf  
41
 Hurrell, A. (2006). Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What space for would-be powers? 
International Affairs, 82 /1: 3. P.2-3 
42
 Rachman, G. (2011, January 3). Think Again: American Decline. Foreign Policy.  
43
 Hart & Jones (2010, 63) 
44
 Terhalle (2011, 341) 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Haibin, N. (2012). “BRICS in Global Governance: A Progressive Force?” Dialogue on Globalization. 
FriedrichEbert-Stiftung.1-6. P.2-3 
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‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P), for example, is an issue that is interpreted differently 
by the BRICS, therefore influenced by the ideas and assertive behaviour of the non-
Western rising powers. According to Stuenkel, this R2P debate can be interpreted in 
the context of the Global North, which supports the idea of intervention and R2P, and 
the Global South (BRICS), which supports sovereignty and the principle of non-
intervention.
47
 As Justin Morris and Stuenkel note, the BRICS do not fully oppose the 
R2P principle, but they are mainly cautious about the coercive pillar III of the R2P, 
which the powerful West could abuse to meet their economic and strategic interests.
 48
 This position of the BRICS became clear when the BRICS countries (minus 
South Africa) took an assertive stance on the humanitarian intervention issue and 
called it a form of imperialism, whereupon they abstained together in the vote to 
intervene in Libya “due to a desire to pursue policies of non-intervention”. 49 
According to Stuenkel and Chris Keeler, because of the BRICS’ negative experience 
with the intervention in Libya (by which the U.S. exceeded the UN mandate 
authorizing action, using airstrikes) the BRICS withstood their assertive stance on 
humanitarian intervention, which resulted in “deadlock” resolution on Syria.50 This 
showed that the disagreements between the Global North and the rising Global South 
on humanitarian intervention and pillar III of the R2P have an impact on the future of 
the R2P. Jennifer Welsh describes this as well, saying, “the R2P was born in an era 
when assertive liberalism was at its height, and sovereign equality looked and smelled 
reactionary. But as the liberal moment recedes, and the distribution of power shifts 
globally, the principle of sovereignty equality may enjoy a comeback”.51   
 Although the BRICS may be more in favour of sovereignty, the debates within 
the R2P are not about whether to act at all, but about how to act.
52
 As Morris notes, 
Brazil’s ‘Responsible while Protecting’ and China’s ‘Responsible Protection’, 
initiatives as a new norm of intervention, give an interesting view of how tensions 
                                                 
47
 Stuenkel, O. (2014). The BRICS and the Future of R2P. Was Syria or Libya the exception? Global 
Responsibility to Protect, 6(1), 3-28. P.11 
48
 Stuenkel (2014,26) and Morris, J. (2013). Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectra of the swinging 
pendulum. International Affairs, 89(5), 1265-1283. P.1276 
49
 Keeler, C. (2011, October 12). The End of the responsibility to protect? Foreign Policy Journal  
50
 Keeler (2011) and Stuenkel (2014,19) 
51
 Welsh, J. M. (2010). Implementing the “Responsibility to Protect”: Where Expectations Meet 
Reality. Ethics & International Affairs, 24(4), 415-430. 
52
 Bellamy, A. J. (2011). Libya and the Responsibility to protect: the Exception and the Norm. Ethics & 
International Affairs, 25(03), 263-269. P.265 
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about pillar III can manifest themselves into assertive behaviour.
53
 However Stuenkel 
argues that the rise of the rising powers compels them to participate more than before, 
Pu notes that these initiatives also show the increasing willingness of rising powers to 
assert their own preferences and opinions to form the global debate on international 
norms.
 54
   
 Besides the United Nations, the BRICS also started to behave more assertively 
in other institutions. The ‘Doha Round of trade negotiations’ and the ‘WTO’s Cancun 
meetings’ at the beginning of this century opened a way for the rising powers to let 
their voice be heard and behave more assertively in the economic arena.
55
 During 
these meetings, the rising powers expressed their demands for fair trade and 
‘globalization with equity’, they protested against the ‘Singapore Issues’ and 
protectionism in the WTO and they uttered their anger about the Western imposed 
restrictions against non-Western countries.
56
 To unite all the demands of the non-
Western middle powers, the ‘India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum’ (IBSA) 
emerged, through which the assertive rising powers could express their unified 
economic demands better in order to get a more prominent (bargaining) place in the 
economic international order.
57
 
 The BRICS countries also behave assertively in the non-proliferation regime. 
India is a classic example of this, since the country did not agree with the 
arrangements proposed by the U.S. on nuclear proliferation, and decided not to sign to 
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
58
 According to Leonard Weiss, the Indian Government 
often called the U.S.-led NPT regime “discriminatory” and “a system of nuclear 
apartheid”.59 Although the BRICS countries have different interests in the nuclear 
(non-proliferation) sphere, they can find common ground on nuclear energy. As 
Richard Weitz argues, the BRICS share a “common pro-nuclear energy perspective”, 
                                                 
53
 Pu (2012, 342) Morris (2013, 1279) 
54
 Stuenkel (2014, 26) and Pu (2012, 342) 
55
 Singh & Dube (2014, 39-40) 
56
 Jordaan, E. (2012). South Africa, multilateralism and the global politics of development. European 
Journal of Development Research, 24(2), 283-299. P.295-296 
57
 Jordaan (2012, 296) 
58
 Garcia, M. (2012). Global Swing States and the non-proliferation order. German Marshall Fund of the 
United States. P2-3 
59
 Weiss, L. (2010). India and the NPT. Strategic Analysis, 34(2), 255-271. P.260 
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which gives them a chance to become a dominant united force in the nuclear order.
 60
 
In addition, the BRICS find common ground on Iran’s nuclear issue, an issue on 
which the BRICS countries behave more assertively, both individually and as a group. 
In order to support this argument, the next chapter of this thesis will apply a case 
study to investigate how, why, and to what degree the BRICS behave more assertively 
towards the Iranian nuclear issue.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60
 Weitz, R. (2014, August 13) How BRICS can advance global non-proliferation agenda. Russian Direct. 
Retrieved May 18, 2015, from http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/how-brics-can-advance-global-
nonproliferation-agenda 
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Chapter 2: Case study: Iran’s Nuclear Issue 
2.1 Iran’s nuclear issue 
Iran started with pursuing nuclear activities in 1957. Initially, the United States helped 
Iran with their nuclear program through the ‘Atoms for Peace Initiative’, but they 
ceased their support in 1979, when the Shah was overthrown and Khomeini took 
power over Iran and ended its nuclear program.
61
 During the 1980s, the program was 
resumed with IAEA involvement and the help of several countries, including Russia 
and China.
62
 In 2002, an opposition group (the Mujahedin-e Khalq) leaked 
information to the U.S. including that Iran had been constructing secret nuclear 
enrichment facilities, which were not declared to the IAEA.
63
 The United States 
immediately reacted to this saying that Iran was making a nuclear bomb and was a 
danger for the international community. However, Iran argued that their nuclear 
program was only for peaceful purposes, which is their inalienable right according to 
Article IV of the NPT.
64
 Due of a lack of a diplomatic relationship between the U.S. 
and Iran, three European powers (Britain, France and Germany) started negotiations 
trying to solve the crisis in 2003.
65
 Iran decided to agree voluntarily with some 
confidence-building measures (the Paris Agreement), which included closer 
monitoring and the temporarily suspension of their Uranium enrichment, while the 
West should come with an agreement with which Iran could satisfy the West that its 
program was purely peaceful.
66
 The approach of the European powers seemed 
promising at first, but failed in the end: The West wanted Iran to stop their enrichment 
program permanently, but Iran rejected this proposal saying that it has the right under 
the NPT to enrich uranium.  
 In 2006, the issue was transferred to the UN Security Council (UNSC), and 
the European negotiation group was joined by the United States, Russia and China 
(P5 of the UNSC + Germany).
67
 Although the IAEA never found evidence of a 
nuclear weapon program, the West still blamed Iran from making a nuclear bomb. But 
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also under the UNSC, Iran refused to give up its right under the NPT, therefore the 
West started sanctioning and threatening with military action against Iran, arguing 
that Iran “was failing to meet its international obligations”.68 Both Western and Non-
Western countries have tried to negotiate a deal with Iran in recent years (think about 
the Tehran Declaration in 2010), but they never made it to a successful deal. However, 
a promising interim agreement between Iran and the P5+1 was signed in November 
2013, called the Geneva Accord and the Joint Plan of Action, of which the final deal 
was first supposed to be reached by June 30
th
, which was extended until July 7 2015.
69
 
On July 7, the U.S. State Department has announced that they will not extend the 
deadline, but would continue the talks until July 10.
70
  
 While the West is accusing Iran of non-compliance, Iran tried to counter 
these accusations, arguing that Iran’s nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes 
and that it has the inalienable right under the NPT to enrich uranium. This dispute 
over Iran’s nuclear program and their rights and obligations as a member of the NPT 
makes the NPT the center of this dispute. According to Flynt Leverett & Hillary 
Mann Leverett, the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program is driven by the various ways 
in which the NPT can be interpreted, which are rooted in different understandings of 
the global order.
 71
 The United States, as the only hegemon, wants to maintain its 
dominance and tries to secure their security interests. Since 9/11, the threat perception 
for the West has moved from the Soviet Union (during the Cold War), to the Middle 
East with the “rogue states”.72 For their own security interests, the U.S. hegemony 
placed greater emphasis on the non-proliferation aim of the NPT in which they 
interpret the right to peaceful nuclear programs and disarmament goals as less 
important than the non-proliferation goal. The U.S. argues that “there is no right to 
enrich”, and that not every country (like Iran as a non-weapon state under the NPT) 
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could and should possess the ‘fuel cycle technologies’ where nuclear bombs can be 
made of.
 73
 Therefore, the United States launched a number of international counter-
proliferation initiatives and told Iran they had to stop or at least suspend their uranium 
enrichment.
74
   
 Being the hegemon, the U.S. wants to maintain the status quo, and they want 
to determine the goals of international policy by which they interpret the rules in a 
way it suits the results they want to achieve with the rules they made, therefore they 
also act in order to impose these rules with their interpretation.
75
 However, many non-
Western countries have criticized the U.S.’ priority on non-proliferation. They argue 
that because of the emphasis on non-proliferation, the United States disregards the 
nuclear disarmament aim of the NPT, and it threatens their right to pursue a nuclear 
program for peaceful purposes, including enrichment.
76
 These states, including Iran 
and the BRICS, interpret the three aims of the NPT (disarmament, non-proliferation 
and right to peaceful nuclear programs) as equally important, and argue, for that 
reason, that Iran has the good right to enrich uranium.
77
  
 In the end, the nuclear issue is not really about nuclear weapons, but is about 
whether the United States can uphold its role as a leader. The West is having issues 
with Iran over multiple things, and they are afraid that Iran could threaten Western 
interests. Therefore, the U.S. policy towards Iran’s nuclear issue is a way to maintain 
their dominance.
78
 Iran’s fight against nuclear proliferation on the other hand, 
together with the BRICS assertive behaviour in this issue, can be seen as efforts to 
challenge Western hegemony.
79
  
2.2 Assertive BRICS  
Although the BRICS countries all have very different nuclear policies, they can find 
common ground on Iran’s nuclear issue. And with their assertive behaviour and 
similar political attitudes towards Iran’s nuclear issue, the BRICS are challenging the 
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unipolar world order and test their independence of the West.
80
 For example, the 
BRICS are behaving assertively by drawing red lines on the Western approaches and 
policies towards Iran and their unilateral interpretation of the NPT trough 
disapproving all of the unilateral (non-UN) sanctions and disapproving the excessive 
pressure on Iran, calling for negotiations on the basis of dialogue and cooperation, 
emphasizing Iran’s right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, moving slowly 
on, object or even vote against UN sanctions, and warning against violations on the 
“territorial integrity and sovereignty” of Iran.81 As will be demonstrated hereafter, this 
assertive behaviour is noticeable in each single BRICS’s country foreign policy as 
well in their policy as a group.  
2.2.1 China 
Assertive behaviour towards Iran’s nuclear issue is clearly present in China’s foreign 
policy. While the United States argues that Iran has no right to enrich uranium, China 
argued on many occasions that Iran does have the right to the peaceful use of nuclear 
power en thus to enrich uranium. For example, in April 2013, Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Hong Lei stressed "as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
Iran possesses the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes while following 
relevant international obligations". 
82
 In addition, Chinese representatives often speak 
up against unilateral sanctions against Iran. Besides the official UN sanctions against 
Iran, the United States often imposed extra unilateral sanctions on Iran to influence 
their policies, including their uranium enrichment program. China refuses to follow 
these unilateral sanctions and advocates negotiations on the basis of dialogue. In 2012 
during the BRICS Summit in Delhi, Chinese trade Minister Chen Deming said: “We 
don’t find any violation of the UN resolution. China wants to develop normal trade 
relationship with all countries including Iran, […] and China does not have to follow 
any domestic law of any particular country. Also, we don’t want to see any negative 
implications on domestic rules and laws of a particular country on the entire 
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international community”.83 In addition, current Foreign Minister of China, Wang, 
noted this year that “whatever the circumstance, we firmly support talks, oppose the 
use of violence and disapprove unilateral sanctions”.84 Although China disapproves 
the unilateral sanctions of the EU and U.S., it has always voted for UN sanctions 
against Iran in the past few years. However, China has opposed many times, or moved 
more slowly on Iran sanctions than the U.S would have liked, or they tried to make 
the sanctions less severe. China (and the other BRICS) never just follows the U.S., but 
always tries to show their independent ideology and policy. For example, the U.S. 
wanted to prohibit all trade relations with Iran when Iran failed to stop its nuclear 
activities by August 31 in 2006. Because Russia and China found this U.S. conceived 
sanction too severe, they made objections.
85
 Because of this assertive behaviour, the 
resolution was amended several times until a compromised version, which also suited 
China and Russia, was passed.
86
  
 
2.2.2 Russia 
Besides the fact that Russia objected to too severe sanctions together with China in 
2006, in 2010 Russia also refused to support a new round of sanctions (resolution 
1929) against Iran unless the U.S. would soften or lift some other sanctions. Again, 
Russia did not just follow the superpower, but stood up for Iran and their own 
interests, which led to several concessions and the attenuation of sanctions against 
Iran.
87
 And in 2015, assertive behaviour of Russia and China was noticeable when 
they objected the ‘snapback provision’ (possibility to reapply the sanctions) proposal 
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of the West during the P5+1 and Iran negotiations to make a nuclear deal, arguing that 
all the sanctions against Iran should be lifted straightaway.
88
 Russia has often tried to 
object or minimize the severe sanctions on Iran, claiming that there is “no evidence of 
any nuclear weapon program in Iran”.89 In addition, Russia takes an assertive stance 
against the United States when they argued that sanctions should not be used to 
change Iran’s behaviour because it is “an instrument for regime change in Iran”, and 
such “measures (threats, sanctions and pressure) would be counterproductive” and 
will “drive Iran in a corner” which makes it even harder to do concessions with them 
regarding its nuclear weapons program.
90
  
 Apart from the fact that Russia takes an assertive stance in the unilateral 
sanctions matter, Russian representatives have on numerous occasions supported 
Iran’s right to nuclear development as well. Although the U.S. would like to isolate 
Iran, Russia continued their involvement with Iran as much as possible after UN 
sanctions.
91
 Russia has good relations with Iran, and their enhanced economic and 
military cooperation, together with Russia’s policies toward the whole Middle East 
challenges the U.S. and their security interests.
92
 Therefore, the close relationship 
with Iran is important for Russia in order to stand up to the West and be more 
independent.
93
 Russia’s assertive stance against the Western hegemony was also 
noticeable in 2011, when they argued that a published report by the IAEA in 
November 2011 on Iran’s nuclear program was not objective, but influenced by the 
United States, therefore Western biased. In a statement of the Russian Foreign 
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Ministry Russia argued that the report is “a compilation of well-known facts that have 
intentionally been given a politicized intonation”, and the authors “resort to 
assumptions and suspicions, and juggle information with the purpose of creating the 
impression that the Iranian nuclear program has a military component”.94 With this 
statement, Russia openly criticized the West and thereby assertively challenged the 
status quo of global politics. 
 
2.2.3 India 
Of all states, India holds an exclusive place in the non-proliferation regime. India has 
never signed the NPT, is building a nuclear program, and made a nuclear deal with 
the U.S. in which it can purchase fuel and technology for its nuclear program. India’s 
assertive behaviour is similar to that of the other BRICS. The country has traditionally 
a close relationship with Iran (and their gas supplies), therefore it has been unwilling 
to impose severe sanctions on Iran. In the case of the unilateral sanctions of the U.S., 
India insists that the sanctions on Iran should not affect their trade ties with the 
sanctioned country because they are “not bound by these unilateral sanctions against 
Iran”.95 In addition, India believes that the solution towards Iran’s nuclear issue “can 
only be found through dialogue” and that Iran has sovereign right to develop nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes.
96
 India has in the past, just like Iran, blamed the NPT 
for its non-compliance to the agreements that are made under the NPT (about the right 
to  peaceful use of nuclear energy).
 97
 Like Iran today, India had been supporting the 
right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the NPT for decades.
98
  
 Although India assertively challenges the West with its position on Iran’s 
nuclear issue and its close ties with Iran, India’s new friendship with the U.S. has 
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created ambiguity in India’s foreign policy towards Iran.99 India, for example, always 
voted with the majority in the IAEA, because as they argued, Iran has voluntarily 
signed the NPT and should for that reason also comply with the rules of the IAEA.
100
 
India thus on the one hand supports Iran’s peaceful nuclear ambitions, but on the 
other hand they also emphasize that Iran has to conform to its international 
obligations. This position became clear in several summits as well. During the Russia-
India-China (RIC) Foreign Minister’s meeting on April 13, 2012 in Moscow, the RIC 
countries argued that Iran has the inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes and they expressed confidence in the need to negotiate these issues 
on the basis of political and diplomatic dialogue and trough negotiations between Iran 
and the IAEA.
101
 On top of that, during the India-Russia Annual Summit in December 
2012, they also stated that Iran “has to comply with the provisions of the relevant UN 
Security Council Resolutions and extend full cooperation to the IAEA”.102  
 
2.2.4 Brazil 
During the last decade, Brazil has set out a more assertive foreign policy under Lula 
da Silva (2003-2010) to strengthen Brazil’s position as a global player, and they 
started to assert its influence on a global scale in order to strive for a world order 
based on multipolarity.
103
 This assertive foreign policy was also noticeable in the 
Iranian nuclear issue. Because Brazil had a similar experience with Western countries 
against their nuclear program years ago, they understand the position of Iran and 
support Iran’s nuclear program, with which they challenge the West. In 2007, Lula da 
Silva stated, “Iran has the right to proceed with the peaceful nuclear research and 
should not be punished just because of Western suspicions it wants to make an atomic 
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bomb”.104 In addition, Lula da Silva also made the comparison with Brazil, stating “If 
Iran wants to enrich uranium, if it wants to handle the nuclear issue in a peaceful way 
like Brazil does, that is Iran’s right”.105 
 In contrast to the isolation policy of the U.S. towards Iran, Brazil has tried to 
improve its relations with Iran and tried to advocate a placatory and cooperative 
approach towards the country.
106
 Besides Brazil conducts a complete different policy 
towards Iran than the U.S., Brazil behaves assertively by openly criticizing this 
isolation policy of the West and advocating for dialogue: “I told President Obama, I 
told President Sarkozy and I told Chancellor Angela Merkel that we will not get good 
things out of Iran if we corner them. You need to create space to talk”.107 What is 
more, at a summit of Latin American leaders in 2010, Lula said, “Peace in the world 
does not mean isolating someone”, followed a month later with the statement that “it 
is not prudent to push Iran against a wall, the prudent thing is to establish 
negotiations”.108 
 In 2010, Brazil and Turkey made an assertive statement when they tried to 
solve Iran’s nuclear issue by making a deal with Iran based on earlier proposals made 
by the P5+1.
109
 They signed the “Tehran Declaration” with Iran on May 17, 2010, 
which showed that Brazil could contribute as a rising power to the solution of an 
important international disagreement. On top of that, with this action, Brazil 
communicated to the world that the country supports Iran’s right to develop nuclear 
power for peaceful purposes. The West rejected the agreement by imposing new 
sanctions on Iran in the UN Security Council. This made Brazil and Turkey furious 
because they argued that the content of the deal was in line with the demands the US 
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described during the talks.
110
 They decided to have themselves voiced through 
blocking the move of the United States to impose new sanctions on Iran in the UN 
Security Council (resolution 1929), saying that they “could not have voted in any 
different way except against”.111 With the frustration over U.S. rejection and over the 
support from China and Russia of the U.S. sanctions, Brazil stated, “It is time that in 
grave matters of war and peace, emerging nations have their voices heard. This will 
not only do justice to their credentials and abilities; it will also be better for the 
world”.112 Brazil has its voice heard and through blocking the U.S. sanctions it has 
showed the direct consequences of their assertive behaviour.
113
 
 
2.2.5 South Africa 
South Africa’s position on Iran’s nuclear issue is quite similar to the rest of the 
BRICS countries. Since South Africa joined the NPT, it has always defended the right 
to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, which is evident in a statement of 
South Africa’s ambassador Ebrahim Mohammad Sali in 2010: “Any signatory to the 
NPT reserves the right to make use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This 
is Iran’s right and no one can deprive you from your right”.114 South Africa has often 
challenged the West by speaking out their distrust of the unilateral West and the 
Western-based institutions on many occasions, while supporting a more multilateral 
world based on multilateral institutions. As a member of the IAEA, South Africa has 
resisted to refer Iran to the UN Security Council, because the country stated that the 
West dominates the UNSC.
115
 Therefore, South Africa has often tried to make the 
UNSC sanctions against Iran less severe. For example, in March 2007 South Africa 
has called for a weakening of proposed sanctions against Iran and asked for a 90-day 
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time out stating that this time could be used to have negotiations with Iran to find a 
solution for the nuclear issue, stating “Sanctions should never be adopted in haste 
when other tracks for the peaceful resolution of a situation should be addressed”.116 
Although the resolution was passed unanimously, South Africa showed their position 
as an assertive rising power, which challenges the unilateral West. The country 
continued with arguing that the Western dominated UNSC is not a proper place to 
deal with Iran’s nuclear issue and expressing the need for international action through 
multilateral institutions.
117
  
 In addition, South Africa also challenged the West when it worked together 
with Brazil and Turkey to raise objections to the U.S.’s idea to use the Additional 
Protocol as a condition to supply. The Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) exists of a 
voluntary group of states that coordinates nuclear exports, and sets up guidelines for 
these nuclear exports.
118
 By doing so, the U.S. once wanted to make the Additional 
Protocol a condition to supply: to transfer the fuel cycle technology. However, the 
rising powers Brazil, Turkey and South Africa took an assertive stance and raised 
objections against the U.S. proposal.
119
 They felt that the Additional Protocol 
condition was a new obstacle for emerging and developing countries’ ability to get 
access to nuclear technology.
120
 Because of this assertive behaviour, the superpower 
was forced to compromise, which worked in favour of the rising powers.  
 
2.2.6 The BRICS 
Since the BRICS countries are a political grouping, they are also behaving more 
assertively towards Iran’s nuclear issue as a group. Because the foreign policy of each 
BRICS country towards Iran’s nuclear issue contains similar agenda points, as we 
have seen in above paragraphs, the BRICS as a group can make their own nuclear 
proliferation agenda and thereby challenge the position of the West. In 2012, the 
similar agenda of the BRICS resulted in a statement of their official position on the 
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Iranian nuclear issue: “We recognise Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
consistent with its international obligations, and support resolution of the issues 
through political and diplomatic means and through dialogue between the parties 
concerned”. 121  During the declaration, they also warned the West that the issue 
should not escalate, because that could have “disastrous consequences of which will 
be in no one's interest”.122 Two years earlier, during the second BRIC summit in 2010, 
the Foreign Minister of Brazil, Celso Amorim already stated that they have similar 
views on the issue, saying, “we see great affinity with the points of view of each 
country”, and “our impression is that the effectiveness of sanctions is debatable”.123 
 While the West launched a number of international counter-proliferation 
initiatives, the BRICS are not supportive in these non-proliferation sanctions, which 
they see as adverse and discriminatory. Therefore, the Brazilian President said that the 
BRICS would reject all the U.S. sanctions on Iran, both at present day and in the 
future. The sanctions the U.S. wanted to impose on Iran in 2012 could cause 
fluctuations in the international oil prices, which could result in supply shortages. 
Therefore, South Africa's Trade Minister Rob Davies similarly said: "I think that we 
all broadly agree with the proposal, the terminology that was made, that if there are 
UN Security Council sanctions then we are all bound by that, but if there are 
sanctions that are imposed by other countries unilaterally, they shouldn't have to 
apply to us".
124
 Besides the fact that the BRICS rejected the U.S. sanctions on Iran, 
they also tried to work around the U.S. sanctions against Iran together. For instance, 
the BRICS use banks outside of the global system and set up new trade agreements 
and energy deals with Iran.
125
 Because the unilateral sanctions of the U.S. also had an 
effect on the BRICS firms, they argued that these measures are seen by them as “an 
extra-territorial attempt to coerce the BRICS to apply Western policies and 
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preferences”.126  This assertive behaviour, which entails that the BRICS refuse to 
imply the U.S. sanctions and also work around the imposed sanctions not only 
challenges the position of the West, but also shows their own (independent) agenda of 
nuclear non-proliferation.   
 During the fifth (2013) and sixth (2014) BRICS Summit in South Africa and 
Brazil, the BRICS position on Iran’s nuclear issue was still the same. Their statements 
were quite similar to the other statements made previous years as well, besides that in 
2013, the BRICS assertively demanded talks between the IAEA and Iran, saying “we 
support resolution of the issues involved through political and diplomatic means and 
dialogue, including between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
Iran”.127 In addition in 2014, the BRICS also highlighted their happiness about the 
Geneva ‘Joint Plan of Action’ pact between Iran and the P5+1, which was set up in 
November 2013 in order to work towards a long-term agreement between the U.S. 
and Iran.  
2.3 BRICS ambiguous policy 
As has been analysed in above paragraphs, the BRICS interpret the NPT differently 
from the West, and challenge the West around Iran’s nuclear issue with their assertive 
behaviour in order to get more influence and become a great power in a multipolar 
word. However, the BRICS advocate a world (and a security culture) that is not 
hegemonic, - they still stick to the unilateral power structures - which means that the 
United States has been confronted with assertive rising states that are showing their 
closeness with Iran, but also keep supporting the U.S. on the nuclear issue of Iran.
128
 
Several examples demonstrate that the BRICS states indeed support the West. A case 
in point is the BRICS’ voting behaviour in the UNSC. Although the BRICS accuse 
the IAEA and the UN Security Council of being unilateral and Western dominated, 
the BRICS countries have always (except Brazil) voted in favour of the UN Security 
Council resolutions, whereby sanctions would be imposed on Iran, and Iran had to 
suspend their enrichment program. Another example may be found in the unilateral 
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sanctions by the BRICS. The BRICS countries have argued that they do not accept the 
unilateral sanctions of the U.S. as being legitimate, and they stated that they would 
not follow these unilateral sanctions.
129
 However, all the BRICS have reduced on their 
transactions with Iran. For example, under U.S. pressure, India and China reduced its 
acquisition of oil from Iran to get sanction waivers, and South Africa even stopped 
with buying crude oil from Iran.
130
 The other BRICS have also limited some kinds of 
trade with Iran
131
. By doing this, as Pieper describes, the United States gets the feeling 
that these unilateral sanctions (although they are not accepted as legitimate) do help 
non-Western states to comply with U.S. policy and preferences.
 132
 Therefore, the 
unilateral sanctions, which are also followed by the BRICS to a certain extent, are an 
utterance of hegemonic power structures.
133
   
 The reason for the ambiguous policy of the BRICS is their dependence of the 
hegemon, both materially and politically.
134
 For example, China and India need 
Iranian crude oil supplies, therefore they purchase oil from Iran and increase their 
relationship with the country. However, they are careful with the sanctions the United 
States has set out, since they do not want to get in a dispute with the West. India is 
afraid that the improvement of the relationship with Iran would undermine the 
strategic partnership it has with the U.S., and China is afraid that it would harm the 
commercial relations between China and the U.S. and Middle East.
135
 This leads to an 
ambiguous policy in which China and India on the one hand enhance relationships 
with Iran, but on the other hand stay at the right side of the U.S. and avoid sanctions 
by reducing the amount of crude oil they buy from Iran. Russia is also flexible and 
does (sometimes) comply with the U.S. approaches towards Iran, which became 
apparent when they did not deliver the S-300 defence system to Iran as a result of the 
‘reset-policy’ of the U.S. and Russia.136 The Iranian nuclear crisis is about power 
politics and the changing world order by which the United States’ power as a 
hegemon is declining and that of the rising powers is increasing. Because a 
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completely alternative international order (in which the world is not unipolar 
anymore) is not present yet, the BRICS’ ambiguous foreign policy is the result of 
their strategic balancing between opposition against and accommodation of the 
hegemon. 
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Conclusion 
With the emergence of the rising powers in the twenty-first century, the world is 
slowly changing from unipolarity to multipolarity. How multipolarity will arrive 
depends on how the rising powers want to be in the new international system, how 
they will use their enhanced power and what their goals are. Therefore, the behaviour 
of the rising powers is determinative for the future of international politics. This thesis 
looked at the assertive behaviour of five rising states, namely Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa (the BRICS). The BRICS convergence on certain agendas 
and their growing assertiveness and influence in global issues is striking. This is not 
only noticeable in the fields of climate change, humanitarian interventions or at 
institutions like the WTO, but is also noticeable at the Iranian nuclear issue. 
In order to fully understand the behaviour of the BRICS countries in the context of 
their assertive behaviour, this thesis employed a case study on the BRICS’ assertive 
behaviour towards Iran’s nuclear issue, questioning: Why, how and to what degree do 
the BRICS behave more assertively towards Iran’s nuclear issue? 
 The Iranian nuclear issue provides an opportunity for the BRICS to assertively 
show their independence of the West and advocate their multipolar world objective. 
In the end, the nuclear issue is not really about nuclear weapons, but it is about 
whether the United States can uphold its role as a leader. The West is having issues 
with Iran over a number of things, and they are afraid that Iran could threaten Western 
interests. Therefore, the U.S. policy towards Iran’s nuclear issue is a way to maintain 
their dominance. Iran’s fight against nuclear proliferation on the other hand, together 
with the BRICS assertive behaviour in this issue, can be seen as efforts to challenge 
Western hegemony, and a way to assert their independence of the West.   
 As was shown in the individual analysis, the BRICS countries behave 
individually and as a group assertively towards Iran’s nuclear issue. For example, they 
are drawing red lines on the Western approaches and policies towards Iran and their 
unilateral interpretation of the NPT trough disapproving all of the unilateral (non-UN) 
sanctions and disapproving the excessive pressure on Iran, calling for negotiations on 
the basis of dialogue and cooperation, emphasizing Iran’s right to use nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes, moving on slowly, object or even vote against UN sanctions, 
and warning against violations on the sovereignty of Iran.  
 But the degree to which the BRICS behave more assertively and 
independently is debatable. Despite the fact that the U.S. has been confronted with 
 31 
assertive rising states that are showing their closeness with Iran, they also keep 
supporting the U.S. on the nuclear issue of Iran. This means that although the BRICS 
disapprove the unilateral behaviour of the West and behave assertively in 
international politics to advocate their multipolar world objective, the BRICS do not 
fundamentally challenge the unilateral power structures right now. The reason for the 
ambiguous policy of the BRICS is their political and material dependence of the 
hegemon. Iran’s nuclear issue is about power politics, and the BRICS’ ambiguous 
foreign policy is the result of their strategic balancing between opposition against and 
accommodation of the United States. The U.S.’ power is declining, but a completely 
alternative international order is not present yet. For now, as the case of the Iranian 
nuclear issue shows, the BRICS will maintain their ‘accommodation of the hegemon’ 
policy as long as the United States is the most powerful country. 
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